The 21st-century world is no better place to live in. There is an uptick in wars and conflicts that have been raging across Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and South America—not to forget the United States’ ubiquitous but central role in almost all the skirmishes. This is in addition to global issues like water scarcity, food crisis, a raging climate, and the rising number of refugees.

The Gulf region has entered one of its most unstable and dangerous periods in decades. The raging on-and-off Israeli-US war with Iran, now spilling across neighbouring Gulf countries, has always had an additional lurking menace in Yemen waiting in the wings to open a new war front, potentially dangerous to the interests of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

As the Kingdom sits at the centre of this increasingly unstable system, it is facing a more aggressive militant Houthi group on its southern flank. The unrestrained group now poses threats to its major cities and energy infrastructure.

Saudi Arabia’s concerns are aggravated by the fact that the Houthis have been positioned and pampered by Iran, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, and hence any compromise with the group might bring to the fore the real danger of Iran coming closer to its borders, posing greater security threats. Of late, the militant group has become an important instrument of Tehran’s regional strategy, particularly in the strategically vital Red Sea corridor.

Add to all this the growing uncertainty about whether its most important traditional security partner—the United States—is still prepared to defend vital Saudi interests.

President Donald Trump’s recent but unwavering behaviour has deepened these concerns. He has made no commitment to Riyadh to provide direct military support against the Houthis. In a separate conversation with the head of Yemen’s internationally recognised government, Trump also made no commitment to intervene militarily.

Rather, American officials have met Houthi representatives in Oman, where they extracted assurances from the Houthis that they will not attack American or Israeli vessels, leaving its trusted ally Saudi Arabia to fend for itself.

This has raised a pertinent question about the US security arrangement in the Middle East. Or was it just a smokescreen to serve the interests of Israel? It needs us to go back to the history of the great game of oil, petrodollar, and security. My focus here, however, is the tumultuous developments of far-reaching ramifications taking place in the region.

It’s a critical moment for Saudi Arabia. An arrangement under which American and Israeli vessels are protected while Saudi ships, ports and infrastructure remain legitimate targets would not constitute a regional ceasefire. It would amount to a selective non-aggression deal that transfers the danger from Washington to Riyadh.

Selective security umbrella

For decades, the tacit arrangement between the United States and the Gulf states was in place, which is, however, now weakening. The US security umbrella was exposed when it failed to respond to the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities. This raised genuine concerns about the credibility of the US protection despite the fact that Washington remains deeply involved in Gulf security. It maintains military bases, sells sophisticated weapons and shares intelligence with regional partners. 

It is not getting clearer by the day that the US would act forcefully when American forces, international shipping, or Israel are directly endangered. The sooner the Middle East countries understand this, the better. Because it is far less predictable when Saudi territory or economic interests are threatened. 

Even during the US-Israeli confrontation with Iran, Gulf states had warned Washington against going to war as they feared the Iranian retaliation. Their geographical proximity, American bases, oil installations, desalination plants, airports and financial centres made them exposed to Iranian missiles and drones even if they did not participate in the initial strikes.

Now, the Gulf states are paying a heavy economic and security price for a war they did not seek, forcing Gulf governments to reassess both their dependence on Washington and the possibility of developing new regional security arrangements with Tehran.

After helping create the conditions for broader skirmishes with Iran, Washington now appears reluctant to contain one of its most immediate consequences: renewed Houthi pressure on Saudi Arabia.

Iran and the Houthis

Iran’s regional strategy has long relied on allied armed groups capable of applying pressure without requiring Tehran to assume full responsibility for every escalation. The Houthis have become one of the most militarily capable actors within this network. They possess missiles, drones, battle-hardened forces and control over substantial parts of Yemen.

Their importance has increased because of geography. Bab Al-Mandab is not simply another maritime passage; it connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. Roughly 7.4 million barrels of petroleum products passed through the strait each day in June 2026, according to figures cited by Reuters.

Saudi Arabia depends upon secure access to both the Gulf and the Red Sea. If the Strait of Hormuz is threatened by Iran while Bab Al-Mandab comes under greater Houthi pressure, the Kingdom could face simultaneous risks to its eastern and western export routes. Recent attacks on the East-West pipeline demonstrated how quickly a military confrontation can become an economic emergency. Saudi Arabia has had to increase shipments through Gulf terminals and develop alternative arrangements through Oman to maintain export flows.

The electoral factor

Understanding the entire gamut of recent developments, we cannot be oblivious to the domestic politics, currently on full display in Israel, which goes to a vote in October, and the United States that has mid-term elections due a month later. These domestic compulsions have put much pressure on their leaders, Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump, respectively. With their popularity at historic lows, they would go to any extent to give an encouraging opinion before the elections.

Trump therefore has political reasons to avoid opening another military front in Yemen. He can tell American voters that he is protecting US ships without becoming trapped in another Middle Eastern war. But what is electorally convenient in Washington may be strategically dangerous for Riyadh.

This produces an extraordinary imbalance: Israel’s electoral politics may encourage confrontation with Iran, while America’s electoral politics discourage Washington from managing the regional consequences. The Gulf states are left between escalation initiated by others and restraint imposed when they require assistance.

What should Saudi Arabia do?

These are testing times for Saudi Arabia. In other words, it has been jolted out of its comfort zone to take things in stride and decide a course that would chart a new path to self-reliance and a security infrastructure with less support from the outside. For now, it needs America, as its intelligence, military technology, logistics, and missile-defence systems remain difficult to replace. But the Kingdom can no longer base its security on assumptions or personal understandings with individual US presidents.

Besides, Riyadh will do well to talk to Washington about its commitments. The two countries need a clearly defined security framework covering missile attacks, threats to shipping, critical infrastructure and armed groups operating with external support.

Yet, Riyadh will do well to continue developing independent defence capabilities, particularly multilayered air and missile defence, drone interception, electronic warfare, cyber protection and domestic production of ammunition and interceptors. 

It must strengthen the regional defense coordination within the Gulf Cooperation Council while deepening carefully selected partnerships with countries such as Pakistan, Türkiye, France, Britain, Egypt and China. Diversification should complement—not merely replace—the American relationship.

Finally, Saudi Arabia needs a unified political and military strategy for Yemen. Air strikes alone cannot produce a durable settlement, but negotiations conducted from a position of vulnerability could institutionalise Houthi coercion. Any agreement must include enforceable restrictions on missiles and drones, protection for Saudi territory and shipping, and a political framework acceptable to Yemen’s recognised institutions and major communities.

Dialogue with Iran should continue. Riyadh and Tehran need mechanisms to prevent miscalculation, protect energy installations and separate their bilateral relationship from fluctuations in US-Iranian and Israeli-Iranian tensions.

The Gulf is currently facing a highly complicated situation: Washington increasingly appears prepared to protect its own forces, its shipping and Israel, while expecting Gulf partners to carry a greater share of their own defence.